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Congress established the federal reclamation program in 1902 to
open up the arid West to irrigated farming and the accompanying eco-
nomic development.' The overriding goal of the reclamation program
was to foster the creation of small, family-sized farms in areas irrigated
by federal projects.2 Over the years, irrigation subsidies have become as
entrenched in western agriculture as the federal farm program subsidies
that support agriculture throughout the country. 3
Although water subsidies originally may have possessed a legitimate
social purpose, that purpose largely has been outlived. Instead of the
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1. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1902).
2. For background on the goals and evolution of reclamation law, see Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) and United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
3. In its 87 year history, the Bureau of Reclamation has grown to be the largest water
provider in the West. As of 1985, the Bureau delivered 31 million acre-feet of water per year
in 17 western states. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 1985 SuM-
MARY STATISTICS: VOL. 1, WATER, LAND AND RELATED DATA 2-3 (1985) (on file at The
Hastings Law Journal). The value of the taxpayer subsidies associated with Bureau water
projects is enormous. For example, the Central Valley Project, one of the Bureau's California
projects, enjoys a subsidy estimated at $3.5 billion. E. LEVEEN & L. KING, TURNING OFF
THE TAP ON FEDERAL WATER SUBSIDIES VOLUME I: THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT:
THE $3.5 BILLION GIVEAWAY (1985) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal); see also Supple-
mental Declaration of David Schuy, Court Record Vol. VI, Tab 71, Ex. E, Peterson v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, Civ. No. S-85-1644-RAR (E.D. Cal. June 24, 1987), appealpend-
ing, Nos. 87-2681, 87-2766, 87-2779, 87-2780, 87-2781 (9th Cir. filed Aug 22, 1987) (Bureau's
estimate is $3.6 billion).
intended small family farmers receiving the benefits, much of the subsi-
dies now go to large growers and corporations. 4 Moreover, the magni-
tude of the subsidies has grown much larger than Congress ever
intended. A recent report on the Central Valley Project found that $1.5
billion of the total $3.5 billion subsidy was dispensed by the Bureau of
Reclamation (Bureau) through practices inconsistent with reclamation
law. 5
Unlimited irrigation subsidies are undesirable from an environmen-
tal standpoint. Water prices set far below cost encourage wasteful irriga-
tion practices and increase the demand for new dams and more
diversions of valuable fresh water. 6 In addition, subsidized water service
encourages irrigation of marginal land, which can aggravate drainage
and pollution problems. In recent years, severe environmental problems
have resulted from Bureau water projects that dump selenium-laden agri-
cultural drainage into rivers, streams, and wetlands. For example, at the
Bureau's drainage ponds in the Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge in
California, thousands of fish and waterfowl were killed or deformed by a
relatively small amount of this toxic drainage originating in one Bureau-
served water district.7
In an attempt to modernize reclamation law while preserving the
goal of family farming-as well as to eliminate improper and excessive
subsidies and the resulting environmental harms-Congress enacted the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (RRA).8 The RRA made numerous
changes to reclamation law. Most significantly, it increased the number
of acres for which a farmer could receive subsidies from 160 acres to 960
4. For example, in 1981 the Bureau reported that the largest 3% of reclamation land-
holders control 31% of the land. WATER AND POWER RESOURCES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, ACREAGE LIMITATION DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-13
to 3-14 (1981) [hereinafter WATER AND POWER RESOURCES SERVICES] (on file at The Has-
tings Law Journal).
5. E. LEVEEN & L. KING, supra note 3, at 3.
6. As with most commodities, below cost pricing of water alters the level of demand:
"Federally subsidized marketable water services tend to be undervalued and overconsumed by
users .... Moreover, federal subsidies-hence low prices for water-blunt western farmers'
incentive to conserve water .... CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFICIENT INVESTMENT
IN WATER RESOURCES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS xiv (1983); see also Levy, Pricing Federal Irri-
gation Water: A California Case Study, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO,
ECONOMIC REVIEW 35 (Spring 1982) (higher water prices would reduce demand for water
and for new water projects).
7. See generally Tragedy at Kesterson Reservoir: Death of a Wildlife Refuge Illustrates
Failings of Water Law, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,386 (1985) (reviewing the various
legal theories being pursued to challenge the Kesterson contamination).
8. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to
390zz-1 (1982)).
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acres. It required, however, that landholdings in excess of 960 acres pay
the "full" cost of any additional water.9 Thus, although the law in-
creased the acreage limitation of a family farm from 160 acres to 960
acres, it brought all farm operations within that definition and sought to
prohibit distribution of subsidized water to land above the limit.
In addition to changing reclamation law substantively, the RRA au-
thorized the Bureau to adopt regulations implementing the new provi-
sions.10 To the surprise of many veteran reclamation observers, the
Bureau initially responded with signs of vigor to its new mandate under
the RRA. Unfortunately, however, the Reagan administration's philo-
sophical opposition to subsidies soon gave way to pressure by agribusi-
ness leaders and intervention of high-level political appointees with ties
to western irrigators. I I Through new schemes and continued bureau-
cratic indifference, a new set of abuses has taken hold and-the goal of true
reform remains unfulfilled.
Nevertheless, the opportunity for genuine reform still exists. In De-
cember 1987, Congress called for a tightening up of the Bureau's imple-
mentation of the RRA. In a series of amendments to the Act, Congress
closed certain loopholes in the Bureau's rules and implementing regula-
tions and toughened up the requirements for auditing large scale farm
operations and collecting underpayments of water costs.12 While these
amendments constituted an important first step toward vindicating the
promise of the RRA, Congress failed to complete a more detailed review
of the Bureau's implementing regulations. 13 The Bureau itself, however,
can revisit the issue as it develops additional data on the failure of its
current rules to accomplish the goals and to implement the directives of
the RRA.
9. § 205(a), 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(a).
10. Id. § 224(c), 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(c).
11. See infra section III.
12. The amendments are contained in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5302(a), 100 Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390nn, 390ww
(Supp. 1988)). The amendments ended subsidies to the very largest farmers who held land
under "extended recordable contracts." They also limited the use of "revocable trusts" as a
means to get around the acreage limitation.
13. During final consideration of the amendments, the chairmen of both the House and
Senate oversight subcommittees made clear that Congress would be taking another look at the
issue. For example, Representative George Miller declared, "[Tihe amendments in this bill do
not attempt to address all of the questions and concerns that have been raised about the imple-
mentation of the Reclamation Reform Act." 133 CONG. REc. E4995-96 (daily ed. Dec. 22,
1987). Senator Bill Bradley stated, "I would alert my colleagues, the Department of the Inte-
rior, and certain water users that this is not the end of the issue." 133 CONG. Rac. S18,677-78
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987).
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This Article suggests a number of specific actions the Bureau can
take to carry out that continuing mandate and achieve the goal of genu-
ine reform of this massive program. To highlight the goals of the RRA,
section I examines the history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the
problems that led to adoption of the RRA. Section II details the design
and intent of the RRA. Section III then examines the gap between the
RRA and the Bureau's 1983 and 1987 implementing regulations. Fi-
nally, section IV concludes that a complete revision of the 1987 rules will
be required to give effect to the intent and mandate of the RRA and
makes several recommendations to accomplish this end.
I. The History of the RRA and the Need for Reform
The federal reclamation program was established in 1902. The
sponsors of the program made clear that it was intended to foster eco-
nomic development and settlement of the West by encouraging small
family farms. For example, Representative Newlands of Nevada, the
principal sponsor of the Reclamation Act, proclaimed that "the very pur-
pose of this bill is to guard against land monopoly and to hold this land
in small tracts for the people of the entire country, to give to each man
only the amount of land that will be necessary for the support of a fam-
ily."'1 4 These goals were echoed by F. H. Newell, the first Commissioner
of the United States Reclamation Service, who saw the purpose of the
Act as
not so much to irrigate the land as it is to make homes.... It is not to
irrigate the lands which now belong to large corporations or to small
ones, it is not to make these men wealthy, but it is to bring about a
condition whereby that land shall be put into the hands of the small
owner, whereby the man with a family can get enough land to support
that family. 15
To insure that the subsidy was restricted to bona fide family farms,
the 1902 Act included antimonopoly and antispeculation provisions.
Foremost among these provisions were the well-known 160-acre limita-
tion and the residency clause. 16 The 160-acre limitation provided that
14. 35 CONG. REC. 6734 (1902) (statement of Rep. Newlands).
15. Official Proceedings of the Irrigation Congress 28 (1905), quoted in Frampton, The
Enforcement of Federal Reclamation Law in the Westlands Water District: A Broken Promise,
13 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 89, 92 (1979).
16. No right to the use of water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a
tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner, and no such sale
shall be made to any landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such
land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said land.
§ 5, 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1902) (emphasis added).
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project water should be used on tracts of 160-acres or less. 17 The resi-
dency clause required that landowners reside on or near the land receiv-
ing subsidized water. These two provisions were intended to apply
simultaneously.' 8 Thus, reclamation water was to be used only on 160-
acre plots farmed by the actual residents of that land.
Nonetheless, landholders devised a variety of multiple ownership ar-
rangements and other creative devices to circumvent the specific statu-
tory limitations on the subsidy. 19 Foremost among these practices was
leasing, since the 160-acre limit was applied only to land that was "pri-
vately" owned. As long as an operator owned no more than 160 acres,
he could lease literally thousands of acres, and the Bureau would accept
this as proper compliance with the 160-acre limitation.20 As a result, it
became common for large landowners and corporations, "posing as bare-
foot family farmers, '21 to make huge profits farming thousands of acres
with heavily subsidized water "paid for in part by the taxpayers from all
over the country."'22 Needless to say, this was possible only because of
the Bureau's failure to enforce the acreage limitation and the residency
requirement together.23
Eventually, the abuses of the reclamation program were docu-
mented, particularly by the late University of California historian Paul S.
Taylor,24 and then publicized. 25 A 1981 Bureau report on acreage limita-
tion found that only twenty-three percent of the land receiving subsidized
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SPECIAL
TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE SAN Luis UNIT 198-99 (1978) [hereinafter SPECIAL TASK
FORCE] (leasing and multiple ownership arrangements have been used to circumvent the goals
of the 1902 Act).
20. Id.
21. 128 CONG. REC. 8827 (1982) (statement of Rep. Udall).
22. Id.
23. The United States does not sell project water directly to the farmer. Rather, the
reclamation laws direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into water service contracts with
irrigation districts organized under state law. Omnibus Adjustment Act, § 46, 43 U.S.C.
§ 423e (1926). The districts then execute subcontracts with the actual users of the water.
According to this arrangement, the districts, rather than the United States, have initial respon-
sibility for ensuring that the recipients of project water comply with federal reclamation law,
including the acreage limitation and excess land provisions. See United States v. Tulare Lake
Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977). The Bu-
reau, however, retains the ultimate responsibility for enforcement and establishes the policies
that guide the districts' enforcement of the law.
24. See, e.g., Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CALIF. L.
REV. 978 (1964); Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J.
477 (1955).
25. E.g., L. LUDLOW & W. HEARST, THE PAPER FARMS (1976) (based on an award-
winning 1975 series of articles in the San Francisco Examiner).
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water was farmed in operations of 160 acres or less. 26 The report also
found that about thirty-seven percent of the land irrigated by Bureau
water was leased, and that almost one-third of Bureau-served farms in-
cluded leased land in their operation. 27
The increasing notoriety surrounding the longstanding abuses of the
reclamation program came to a head in the mid-1970s with lawsuits,
public attention, and congressional hearings. In 1975, National Land for
People, an organization of farmworkers and small farmers from the San
Joaquin Valley in California, filed suit to challenge the Bureau's failure to
implement the provisions of reclamation law governing excess lands.28
These provisions required large farms (those over 160 acres) to be broken
up after a period of time and sold at reduced prices that were affordable
to genuine family farmers. 29 A District of Columbia district court agreed
with the plaintiffs that the Department of the Interior should initiate
rulemaking proceedings to carry out these crucial and longstanding pro-
visions of reclamation law.30 The court enjoined the approval of new
sales of excess lands pending the enactment of new rules. 31 In response,
the Bureau issued proposed rules in August 1977 that would have imple-
mented the excess land law; these rules also would have required strict
enforcement of the existing residency requirement and acreage limits. 32
Affected growers from California's San Joaquin Valley, however, imme-
diately filed suit in a California district court and obtained an injunction
in December 1977, blocking the final rules.33 The court required the Bu-
reau to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the poten-
tial impact of the proposed rules, but before the final EIS was completed,
several years passed and a new administration moved into the White
House. With the 1977 rules enjoined and the advent of the Reagan Ad-
ministration, the focus shifted to Congress to resolve the uncertainties in
the enforcement of reclamation law.
During the 1970s, congressional concern about the reclamation pro-
gram was on the increase. Members of Congress denounced the various
devices for circumventing the 160-acre limitation, especially "the prac-
tice of long-term leasing [which] has long since made a mockery of the
26. WATER AND POWER RESOURCES SERVICES, supra note 4, at 3-14.
27. Id. at 3-13.
28. National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation of the Dep't of the Interior,
417 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1976).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1982).
30. National Land, 417 F. Supp. at 452-53.
31. Id. at 453.
32. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044 (1977).
33. County of Fresno v. Andrus, Civ. No. F-77-202 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1977).
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law."' 34 Indeed, after reviewing a General Accounting Office report that
detailed a pattern of investments in reclamation lands followed by leases
of those same lands to large farm operators, 35 Senator Gaylord Nelson
concluded that "reclamation law has, at best, had no effect on the size of
farming operations, and consequently has not fostered family farms. At
worst, it has served to encourage large-scale farms."'36
A special task force set up by Congress on the San Luis Unit of the
Central Valley Project specifically found that the practice of leasing frus-
trated congressional intent. It noted that large farm operators retained
"de facto control," if not ownership, over thousands of acres, and ob-
served further that "[t]he legislative history of the 1902 Act and later
reports... show that Congress in no way intended that large scale leas-
ing or multiple ownership arrangements (such as corporations and
trusts) might be allowed to circumvent the goals of the reclamation pro-
gram."' 37 The Secretary of the Interior also agreed that "[1]easing has
become perhaps the principal vehicle for frustrating the intent of recla-
mation law."'38
In addition to the problem of leases, Congress also became con-
cerned about the magnitude of the subsidies collected by large farm oper-
ations. In some cases subsidies had grown to scandalous proportions. In
1979 Senator Nelson reported with astonishment that one Bureau cus-
tomer, the Southern Pacific Railroad, would receive a ten-year taxpayer
subsidy amounting to $60 million. 39
As a result of congressional concern about abuses in the reclamation
program, as well as western growers' fear of the Bureau's 1977 proposed
regulations, Congress considered various proposals to revise and reform
reclamation law.4° After five years of legislative debate, a compromise
34. Acreage Limitations and Bureau of Reclamation Projects: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 541 (1978) [hereinafter Acreage Limitations Hearings] (statement of Sen.
Church); Will the Family Farm Survive in America? Part , Joint Hearings Before the Select
Comm. on Small Business and the Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
35. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CONGRESS
SHOULD REEVALUATE THE 160-ACRE LIMITATION ON LAND ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE WATER
FROM FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROJECTS 1-3 (1972) (on file at The Hastings Law
Journal).
36. Acreage Limitations Hearings, supra note 34, at 231 (statement of Sen. Nelson).
37. SPECIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 199.
38. Acreage Limitations Hearings, supra note 34, at 541 (statement of Cecil B. Andrus).
39. 125 CONG. REC. 24,342 (1979) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
40. Frampton, supra note 15, at 103.
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was reached in the RRA and the final version of the RRA was approved
on October 12, 1982. 4 1
It is ironic that the RRA emerged near the beginning of the Reagan
administration. While this administration supposedly was committed to
a free market philosophy and actively hostile to government subsidy pro-
grams, the RRA in many respects expanded taxpayer subsidies, and loos-
ened up most of the key restrictions in the 1902 law. Nevertheless, the
bill contained one fundamental trade-off for these major new benefits to
western agribusiness: All operators that exceeded 960 acres would have
to pay the "full cost" for the water delivered to those excess acres. 42
Moreover, there was reason to believe that the Reagan administration
would work to uphold the RRA, and that irrigation subsidies at long last
would be limited as Congress originally had intended. For example,
when he first came into office, Interior Secretary James Watt ordered a
cessation of water deliveries to the Westlands Water District by the end
of 1981 unless that district agreed to pay a higher price for its water.43
Unfortunately, the Reagan administration's commitment to end
water subsidies proved short-lived. The last six and a half years have
shown that the Bureau's approach to enforcing the acreage limits and
pricing requirements of the RRA is as recalcitrant and politically con-
trolled as was the traditionally lax enforcement that led to the adoption
of the RRA in the first place.
II. The Design and Intent of the RRA
A. The Basic Scheme of the RRA
In passing the RRA, Congress made some fundamental changes in
the previous reclamation law. The Act's principal features include:
(1) an expanded acreage limitation for the delivery of subsidized
water to owned land of up to 960 acres;44
(2) an allowance for the delivery of subsidized water to leased
lands up to 960 acres; 45
(3) an allowance for the delivery of full-cost water to unlimited
leased lands in excess of 960 acres; 4
6
41. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to
390zz-1 (1982)).
42. § 205, 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(a)(1).
43. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Interior to General Manager of the Westlands
Water District (May 21, 1981) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
44. § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 390dd.
45. Id. § 205, 43 U.S.C. § 390ee.
46. Id.
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(4) a requirement that water prices in all new or amended con-
tracts be increased as necessary to cover full project operation and
maintenance (0 & M) costs;47
(5) the "hammer clause," which provides that by April 12, 1987,
all landholders must conform to the new law or pay full cost for water
delivered to lands leased in excess of 160 acres;48 and
(6) elimination of the residency requirement. 49
Each of these provisions is discussed in detail below.
The decision to increase the acreage limit from 160 acres to 960
acres reflects the view of some western interests that 960 acres is the
modern-day equivalent of a 160-acre farm in 1902. 50 While Congress
was willing to relax its notion of the size of a family farm, it clearly
expressed its impatience with the type of "paper farming" schemes that
had been so prevalent in the past. Thus, the RRA mandated that large-
scale farmers be charged "full cost" for all water delivered to land in
excess of 960 acres.5 1
In addition to requiring large growers to pay full cost for water used
on lands in excess of 960 acres, the RRA made an important change
affecting the level of subsidy available to all water users. While Congress
wished to continue to extend the interest subsidy to small farmers, it
wanted all water users to pay a price at least great enough to cover the
Bureau's 0 & M costs.5 2 Many users do not pay prices adequate to meet
the program's costs. For example, in one of the Bureau's largest projects,
the Central Valley Project in California, long-term contracts for irriga-
tion water have kept water prices so low that payments have not even
covered full 0 & M costs. 53 To address such problems, the RRA pro-
47. Id. § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 390hh(a).
48. Id. § 203(b), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b).
49. Id. § 211, 43 U.S.C. § 390kk.
50. 128 CONG. REc. 8808-09 (1982) (statement of Rep. Kazen). The Bureau found that
97.4% of the farms receiving federal reclamation project water as of the late 1970s were 960
acres or less. WATER AND POWER RESOURCES SERVICES, supra note 4, at 3-14.
51. § 205, 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(a)(1).
52. Id. § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 390hh. This provision did not address the other component of
reclamation contracts allocated to repayment of construction costs. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C.
§ 485h(d)(2) (1939).
53. In 1987, the Bureau reported that its fixed contract rates in the CVP "have been
exceeded by annual operation and maintenance costs in a substantial number of cases." Bu-
REAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION IRRIGATION RATESETTING POLICY, PUBLIC
REVIEW DOCUMENT, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT, CALIFORNIA 1 (1987) [hereinafter IRRI-
GATION RATESETTIN6 POLICY]. The legality of allowing such 0 & M deficits is questionable.
Section 9 of the 1939 Act, like all other preexisting provisions of reclamation law that are not
inconsistent with the RRA, was expressly reaffirmed by the RRA. § 224(a), 43 U.S.C.
§ 390ww(a) (1982). In § 9(e) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, Congress required the
Secretary to set contract rates that "will produce revenues at least sufficient to cover an appro-
priate share of the annual operation and maintenance cost and an appropriate share of...
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vides that water prices in all new or amended contracts be adjusted to
cover full project O & M costs.5 4 Moreover, to bring water users under
the new pricing provisions, the RRA uses a carrot and stick approach to
encourage districts to amend their existing contracts.
The main carrot offered by the RRA is the option of increasing the
amount of acreage eligible to receive federal water. If a district wishes to
receive subsidized water to deliver to farmers owning or leasing more
than 160 acres, either the district must amend its contract with the Bu-
reau,5 5 or those individual farmers must sign an "irrevocable election"
agreeing to conform with the new law.56 This irrevocable election would
require, among other things, that the farmer pay at least the full 0 & M
costs on all water received, including any increases that may occur in the
future. In addition, the new rates must reflect the allocated share of pro-
ject construction costs, although without interest. 57
If a district with landholdings over 160 acres does not amend its
contract and its farmers have not met the new law's requirements, then
the stick is applied. Beginning in April 1987, all operators in such dis-
tricts were required to pay the full cost for all water delivered to land
leased above 160 acres. The full cost includes a capital component, inter-
est on the unrepaid capital, and full 0 & M costs. 58 This "stick" often
has been referred to as the "hammer clause." 59
The RRA requires similar price concessions from a district that
wishes to amend its contract with the Bureau to obtain "additional or
supplemental benefits."' 60 For example, if a district wishes to increase the
acreage that may receive subsidized water or the amount of water it re-
ceives, or obtain some other additional benefit, the district must amend
its contract with the Bureau to conform to the RRA and agree to pay a
rate that recovers both the district's share of the project's capital costs
[construction] charges." Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C. § 485h(e) (1939) (em-
phasis added). In addition, § 6 of that Act requires "advance payment of adequate operation
and maintenance charges." Id. § 485e (emphasis added). Contract payments that are inade-
quate to cover the allocated 0 & M charges are obviously not "adequate" under § 6, and since
that also means that no construction charges are being recovered for those contracts, § 9(e)'s
requirement that "an appropriate share" of construction costs be recovered is also being
ignored.
54. § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 390hh(a).
55. Id. § 203(a), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(a).
56. Id. § 203(c), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(c).
57. See supra note 53. Amendments to § 9(e) contracts that are subject to the RRA must
insure repayment of an "appropriate share" of construction charges as well as full 0 & M
charges. The Bureau, however, generally has disregarded this requirement. Id.
58. § 203(b), 43 U.S.C. § 390bb(3)(A) (1986).
59. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 26,073 (1982) (statement of Rep. Udall).
60. § 203(a), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(a) (1982).
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and the Bureau's current and future 0 & M costs. As indicated above,
many districts currently are paying a rate that does not recover even
actual 0 & M costs. 61 Thus, the requirement that amended contracts
provide for these higher rates, even though they are less than the full cost
rate, already has resulted in modest to significant price jumps for many
districts, 62 and will continue to do so as rates are adjusted each year in
the future.
While it might appear that the prospect of paying increased rates to
cover 0 & M costs would dissuade growers from amending their con-
tracts, the prospect of paying full cost for water used on lands in excess
of 160 acres should be an even stronger counter-balancing incentive for
amendment. This is so because full cost rates are much greater than full
O & M rates. For example, the full cost rate in the Kanawha Water
District in the Sacramento Valley was calculated in 1987 to be $52.62 per
acre-foot, in contrast to a rate of $11.42 for 0 & M plus capital costs that
excludes interest (also called the "cost of service" rate).63 Similarly, the
full cost rate in the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District in the San Joa-
quin Valley was calculated at $48.69 per acre-foot, while the cost of ser-
vice rate was only $12.47 per acre-foot.M
B. The Goals Behind the RRA
The new acreage limitation was intended to cover all operations of
960 acres, whether the acres were distributed in numerous districts or
concentrated in one district. 65 Many in Congress, however, felt that the
new acreage limit was too high and the allowable subsidy too great. A
number of Senators denounced the RRA for giving up the residency re-
quirement and expanding the acreage limitation while at the same time
authorizing water service to unlimited amounts of leased land. 66 None-
theless, in exchange for these and various other new benefits for western
water users, Congress did establish one major reform: a firm, compre-
hensive limit on the size of a farm unit eligible for subsidized water.
Under the RRA, water service to any landholdings or farm units in ex-
cess of the 960-acre limit must be at full cost.
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62. IRRIGATION RATESETTING POLICY, supra note 53, at 1.
63. Id. Schedule 1.
64. Id.
65. § 202(6), 43 U.S.C. § 390bb(6) (1982). The Conference Report and other legislative
history repeatedly speak of farming "operations," demonstrating an intent to go beyond the
previous focus on ownership to cover all farms, however structured. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.
855, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1265.
66. 128 CONG. REC. 25,110-16 (1982) (statements of Sens. Proxmire and Moynihan).
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Though Congress specifically exempted certain types of situations,
such as isolated tracts of land, 6 7 these exemptions were intended to apply
only to the ownership ceiling, not to the pricing requirements of the law
or the full cost repayment mandate.68 Thus, as indicated by Representa-
tive Miller, a primary author of the legislation, the provisions of the
RRA were to be applied broadly and were not to be avoided through the
use of legal subterfuge:
Clearly, if a farm operation is several thousand acres, whether by
ownership or lease, the goal of small farming is frustrated .... We are
not going to impose a compulsory land redistribution program on
western farmers. But neither are we going to shower on large, profita-
ble farming operations the benefits intended fo" small, family farm-
ers.... While most individuals knowledgeable about the water issue
agree that the pricing reforms are equitable, some question how
broadly they will be applied. This is a crucial question, because the
last thing we want to do is to create a sound pricing program that
applies to no one, or merely to those who cannot afford expensive law-
yers who can wiggle their way loose of this legislation. There is no
wiggle room in this legislation. 69
In sum, the RRA was an attempt by Congress to preserve the heart
of federal reclamation law-to foster family farming and to avoid the
monopolization of federal irrigation subsidies by large corporations-
while updating the law in response to modern farm economic pressures.
Moreover, the Act represents a clear attempt to eliminate the huge subsi-
dies flowing to large-scale private interests due to the Bureau's misman-
agement, lax enforcement, and incorrect interpretations of existing
reclamation law. Unfortunately, the RRA's vision largely has been ig-
nored or undermined by the Bureau.
III. The Gap Between the Law and Its Implementation
In addition to changing reclamation law substantively, the RRA ex-
pressly authorized the Bureau to adopt regulations implementing its vari-
ous new provisions. 70  The adoption of formal implementation
regulations marks a major departure from the Bureau's past practices,
when regional directors or other political appointees typically called the
shots through internal memoranda or legal opinions that largely were
hidden from public view. 7 1 Unfortunately, the Bureau has proved just as
67. § 217, 43 U.S.C. § 390qq.
68. Id.
69. 128 CONG. REc. 26,076-77 (1982) (statement of Rep. Miller).
70. § 224(c), 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(c).
71. See, e.g., National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation of the Dep't of the
Interior, 417 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Northern Cal. Power Agency v. Mor-
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vulnerable to the pressure of agricultural interests in its rulemaking pro-
cess as it was in its former ad hoe decisionmaking approach.
The Bureau has promulgated two major sets of rules to implement
the RRA. The first set of rules was adopted on December 6, 1983,72
shortly after passage of the Act, and the second set was adopted on April
13, 1987,73 the day after the hammer clause was to go into effect. In both
rulemaking proceedings a clear pattern emerged. Proposed rules were
issued providing for relatively vigorous enforcement of the Act. Then,
following extensive pressure by water lawyers and agribusiness lobbyists,
the Bureau published a set of final rules, which acceded to the growers'
complaints on virtually every significant issue. In so doing, the Bureau
has adopted rules that defy the clear intent of the RRA. Following is a
description of the main areas in each set of rules in which the Bureau
bowed to growers' protests and abdicated its responsibilities under the
R-RA.
74
A. Round One: The 1983 Rules
The Department of the Interior (acting on behalf of the Bureau)
initiated the first rulemaking proceeding shortly after the RRA passed.
Proposed rules were published in the Federal Register on May 3, 1983. 75
While the proposed rules generally embodied both the spirit and the re-
quirements of the RRA, the final rules that emerged after the extensive
comment period represented a major retreat. The Bureau reversed itself
between the proposed and final rules on two key issues: (1) implementa-
tion of the hammer clause, and (2) treatment of capital repayment obliga-
tions in amended contracts.
The proposed rules provided for full implementation of the key pro-
vision of the RRA, the hammer clause.76 Nonetheless, in response to
protests against the hammer clause from western agricultural interests,
the Department deleted all reference to the hammer clause in the final
rules. The Supplemental Information accompanying the final rules indi-
cates two reasons for this major omission. First, fifty-two people voiced
ton, 396 F. Supp. 1187, 1189-91 (D.D.C. 1975), (Bureau's informal, unpublished power rate
making procedures held unlawful) aff'd, 539 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
72. 48 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1983).
73. 52 Fed. Reg. 11,938 (1987) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 426 (1987)).
74. The rules are extensive and complex. There were dozens of changes from the pro-
posed rules to the final rules, many of them contrary to clear congressional intent. This discus-
sion focuses only on the most prominent changes.
75. 48 Fed. Reg. 19,900 (1983).
76. See, e.g., § 426.7, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,905-08 (1983).
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strong objection to the hammer clause. 77 Second, the Department itself
was considering proposing legislation to repeal the hammer clause due to
a number of concerns about its impact.78 Indeed, Secretary of the Inte-
rior William Clark claimed section 203(b) of the RRA was unconstitu-
tional and asked Congress to repeal it.7 9 Congress took no action on
Clark's request, however, and the hammer clause ultimately was held
constitutional by a federal court in California.80
The second key issue on which the Bureau reversed itself between
the proposed and final rules was the treatment of capital repayment obli-
gations in amended contracts. Under the RRA, districts that amend
their contracts with the Bureau to receive "additional or supplemental
benefits," for example additional water deliveries, also must comply with
the RRA, including its pricing reforms. 8' This means, among other
things, that districts that come under the RRA must pay at least enough
to cover full 0 & M charges. For those districts with whom the Bureau
has a typical "9(d) repayment contract,"' 82 this determination is easy, be-
cause such contracts specify separate charges for 0 & M versus capital
repayment. In some projects, however, such as the Central Valley Pro-
ject, districts have "9(e) water service contracts, ' 83 which contain a sin-
77. See id. at 54,757.
78. The Secretary [of the Interior] is also concerned about the potential impact of
this section of [sic] the financing abilities of some irrigation districts. The Depart-
ment is considering proposing legislation to repeal section 203(b). If section 203(b) is
not repealed by January 1, 1987, however, then the Department will take all actions
necessary to fully implement this section of the law.
Id.
79. 130 CONG. REC. S584 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1984) (statement of Sen. McClure, introduc-
ing, "at the request of the administration," S. 2238, "A Bill to Repeal Section 203(b) of the
RRA").
80. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Peterson v. United States Dep't of
the Interior, Civ. No. S-85-1644-RAR (E.D. Cal. June 24, 1987), appeal pending, Nos. 87-
2681, 87-2766, 87-2779, 87-2780, 87-2781 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 22, 1987). The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant United States and intervenor-defendant Natural
Resources Defense Council in five consolidated actions. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs appealed and their
appeals were consolidated with an appeal from a similar case, Central Valley Project Water
Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the Interior, Civ. No. S-87-0175-RAR. The appeals are pend-
ing before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
81. § 203(a), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(a) (1982).
82. These are contracts executed under authority of Reclamation Project Act of 1939,
§ 9(d), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d) (1939). These provide for the complete repayment of construction
costs (without interest) in a specified period (as contrasted with § 9e contracts).
83. These contracts are executed under authority of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939,
§ 9(e), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(e). These are for projects, not yet completed, for which a final con-
struction cost to be repaid has not been established. The contract rate then is based on an
estimate of the construction costs and other costs to be paid.
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gle rate that does not distinguish between 0 & M charges and capital
charges.
Operators and districts in California used this lack of a bifurcated
rate in their contracts to argue against the Bureau's proposed rules,84
which required that all amended contracts include charges for both capi-
tal repayment (without interest for all lands below 960 acres) and full 0
& M costs. 85 The water users argued that the RRA only allowed an
increase in the single contract rate sufficient to cover full 0 & M, not full
O & M plus capital. While the growers' view clearly is contradicted by
existing reclamation law, which requires all contracts to collect "an ap-
propriate share" of capital costs,86 the Department bowed to the grow-
ers' pressure and changed the proposed rule. The final 1983 rule
required that the amended contract rate be set sufficiently high to cover
only 0 & M costs. 87
B. Round Two: The 1987 Rules
The skirmishes between the growers and the Bureau during the 1983
rules were just a warmup for the battle during the second rulemaking
proceeding in 1987. The impetus behind the second rulemaking proceed-
ing was the need to adopt regulations implementing the hammer clause,
which was scheduled to go into effect on April 12, 1987.88 In addition,
the Bureau sought to address new farming arrangements designed to cir-
cumvent the Act's acreage limitations. Needless to say, this second set of
proposed rules drew another storm of protest from large-scale growers.
In early 1986, a field draft of the new proposed rules was leaked to
California water users, who immediately expressed their opposition to
any changes in the regulations. The Bureau's response was quick and
sympathetic. Commissioner C. Dale Duvall held meetings with the
water users before the draft regulations were released to the public. 89
Some of these same water users were parties to lawsuits seeking to over-
turn the hammer clause and to block its implementation. The secrecy
surrounding the field draft and proposed rules provoked a letter from
Representative George Miller, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Water and Power Resources, to Interior Secretary Donald Hodel, accus-
84. See 48 Fed. Reg. 54,758 (1983) (comment I on § 426.8(a) of the proposed rules).
85. § 426.8(a)(1), 48 Fed. Reg. 19,908 (1983).
86. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. 48 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,776 (1983).
88. § 203(b), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b) (1982).
89. See Letter from C. Dale Duvall to Hamilton Candee (June 3, 1986) (on file at The
Hastings Law Journal); Draft Letter from C. Dale Duvall to Rep. George Miller (May 21,
1986) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
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ing the Bureau of violating the requirements of openness and fairness in
the rulemaking process. 90
Following these private discussions and one subsequent public ses-
sion, representatives of the Bureau, the Department of Interior, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, and the Department of Justice spent
seven months negotiating changes. The proposed rules ultimately pub-
lished on November 7, 1986, 9' were weaker in various aspects than the
earlier field draft. 92 Nonetheless, they were stronger than the 1983 rules
and would have improved the Bureau's enforcement of the law consider-
ably. After much further outcry, however, the situation changed dra-
matically when the final rules were adopted on April 13, 1987.
Perhaps the best explanation of the Bureau's radical modification of
its proposed rules was given by Bureau Commissioner C. Dale Duvall, in
a briefing on the final rules to the National Water Resources Association:
[W]e used somewhat the purposes of the Act to come up with the No-
vember rules. I think that's as close to an apology as I am going to
give to you. That set of rules pretty well carried out what the Con-
gressmen and the Senators said they were doing with that Act. Our
new set of rules that we've put into place are cut based upon an en-
tirely different principle, and the different principle came as a result of
our putting the November rules out on the street and coming out here
in the West and sitting through fifteen agonizing days of workshops
and hearings, wherein you people for the most part did that which,
thank God, we are allowed to do in this country, you sat back on your
heels and you bellyached . . .93
Thus, the Bureau exhibited once again its willingness to accommodate
the concerns of western agribusiness. Following is a description of how
the Bureau capitulated, issue by issue, to the interests of the water users
in the final 1987 rules.
(1) Farm Management Arrangements
Leasing was the predominant business arrangement employed
before passage of the RRA to circumvent the old acreage limitation, and
90. Letter from Congressman George Miller to Interior Secretary Donald Hodel (May
12, 1986) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
91. 51 Fed. Reg. 40,742 (1986).
92. For example, in an effort to prevent trusts for minor children from being used to
increase a family's acreage entitlement, the field draft provided that such a child could not
establish "independence" (that is, the right to a separate acreage limit) on the basis of the trust
itself. In the November proposed rules, however, this was weakened to a one year waiting
period before dependents (for I.R.S. purposes) could become "independent" for RRA pur-
poses. See § 426.6(b)(4), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,753-54 (1986).
93. Remarks of Bureau Commissioner C. Dale Duvall, meeting of the National Water
Resources Association, Reno, Nevada, Apr. 13, 1987 (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
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Congress expressly applied the acreage limitation and full cost pricing
requirements to leased land.94 If Congress had realized how easily leases
would be transformed into similar alternative arrangements, it undoubt-
edly would have expressly, rather than implicitly, applied the same acre-
age limitation and full cost pricing requirements to such arrangements as
were applied expressly to leases.
In fact, following passage of the RRA the lawyers and accountants
of large-scale growers were quite busy creating new farm management
arrangements. Bureau staff began to discover a disturbing pattern of re-
organizations. Landowners began setting up what the Bureau considered
"questionable farm management arrangements in order to avoid becom-
ing subject to the full cost payments" applicable to leased lands.95 These
farm management arrangements, which have been documented by the
California Institute for Rural Studies, 96 are essentially amalgamations of
960-acre parcels, usually contiguous, that are managed by a business that
in turn typically consists of the same people who hold the 960-acre par-
cels. For example, a 7,000-acre operation in Westlands previously oper-
ated under a lease would simply "restructure" the leased lands into
separate 960-acre parcels, each owned by a different business partner or
investor, who then collectively "manage" the entire operation via a sepa-
rate company that is owned or controlled by the same partners or
investors.
In order to prevent such abuses, the proposed rules sought to close
the farm management arrangement loophole by requiring that any such
arrangement in which the farm manager or operator had any economic
interest, direct or indirect, be treated the same as a lease.97 Thus, all
farming operations in excess of 960 acres would have been presumed to
be the equivalent of a lease except for farm operations in which the
outside manager or operator is paid a fee that does not depend upon the
amount of crop produced.
The proposed rules also would have placed the burden on large-
scale operators to demonstrate that any operation in excess of 960 acres
was not a lease.98 The proposed rules included a requirement that leases
94. §§ 202(b), 205, 43 U.S.C. §§ 390bb(6), 390ee (1982).
95. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ISSUE PAPER No. 4, at 1
(1986) (emphasis added).
96. D. VILLAREJO, How MUCH IS ENOUGH? FEDERAL WATER SUBSIDIES AND AGRI-
CULTURE IN CALIFORNIA'S CENTRAL VALLEY (1986) [hereinafter How MUCH IS ENOUGH]
(on file at The Hastings Law Journal); D. VILLAREJO & J. REDMOND, MISSED OPPORTUNI-
TIES-SQUANDERED RESOURCES (1988).
97. § 426.7(a)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,756 (1986).
98. Id.
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and agreements concerning the operation of a farm be in writing and be
made available to the Secretary.99 In addition, owners and operators, as
opposed to owners and lessees, would have been required to complete
certification and reporting forms.' °° The proposed rules also contained
penalty provisions for any "scheme or device" designed to evade or hav-
ing the effect of evading the rules, 101 and for failure to report landholding
information. 10 2
Thus, the proposed rules would have curtailed sharply the ability of
water users to avoid the 960-acre subsidy limitation through farm man-
agement arrangements. Common economic interests between an operat-
ing company and the owners of land parcels would have triggered the
same full cost pricing requirements as a lease. Moreover, instead of the
Bureau doing the unlikely job of ferreting out these scams, the proposed
rules would have created a rebuttable presumption that an operation is a
lease (because it is over 960 acres) and placed the burden on the grower
to prove otherwise.
The final rules, however, abandon these two safeguards. First,
under the final rules, the definition of a lease excludes the type of farm
management arrangements described above. A lease includes only those
farm management arrangements in which the operator assumes the eco-
nomic risk in the operation and management of the farm. 0 3 Thus, as
long as the payment received by the entity that "manages" or operates
the large operation is not directly dependent on the success of the opera-
tion, the final rules contain no limitation on the subsidies that can be
obtained through such arrangements.
Second, the final rules remove the rebuttable presumption for large
operations and put the burden back on the Bureau to discover and prove
all potential abuses by farm management arrangements. 1°4 This job was
made particularly difficult by several other changes in the final rules. For
example, the final rules weaken the sanctions of the proposed rules for
failure to report landholding data. 05 Also, the final rules retain the ulti-
mate sanction of terminating water service, but do not indicate what pen-
alty is applicable to water already delivered to a water user who has
failed to report. '0 6 By contrast, the proposed rules would not have per-
99. § 426.7(b)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,756 (1986).
100. Id.
101. § 426.23, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,774 (1986).
102. § 426.10(k), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,763 (1986).
103. 43 C.F.R. § 426.7(a)(3)-(4) (1987).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 426.10(k).
106. Id.
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mitted nonreporting irrigators to continue receiving water service with-
out risking higher charges. The final rules encourage the irrigator to just
wait for the Bureau to discover them and initiate a cut-off. Similarly, the
final rules drop the provision found in the proposed rules that imposed a
penalty for the use of any scheme or device intended to avoid the intent
of the rules. 107 The growers had protested this rule on the grounds that
it was an unfounded "insult" to suggest that any irrigator would ever use
a scheme or device to evade acreage limitation. 108
The final rules also made the Bureau's job more difficult than did the
proposed rules by not requiring operators to submit reporting forms I09
and by not even defining who is an "operator."1 0 In contrast, the pro-
posed rules defined an operator as "a person who operates a farm by
either doing or supervising the work and by making day-to-day operating
decisions."' 1 Operators would have been required to submit certifica-
tion and reporting forms along with owners and lessees. The water users,
however, pressured the Bureau to delete any reference to the word "oper-
ator," presumably to limit all acreage and pricing limitations to formal
owners and lessees, rather than the full range of managers, consultants,
or other operators who might actually run the farms. While the Bureau
staff originally took the position that it could not determine whether a
farm operator was in fact a lessee under the regulations unless it had
information about those operators, the final rules dropped all reference to
"operators." Thus, only owners and lessees, and not operators, are re-
quired to comply with reporting requirements.
(2) Trusts
A key ingredient of the farm management arrangements that sprung
up after 1982 was the trust. A 1986 Bureau report pointed out that the
1983 regulations did not place sufficient restrictions on the development
of trusts, and "as a result, trusts could become a means for circum-
venting the acreage limitation of the RRA."112
Trusts are used in this way, for example, when a large landowner
with four minor children and 4,000 acres of land creates a trust of 960
acres for each child, as promulgated, but continues to operate the entire
107. Compare § 426.23, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,774 (1986) with § 426.23, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,979
(1987).
108. See 52 Fed. Reg. 11,953 (1987) (comment 1 on § 426.23).
109. 43 C.F.R. § 426.10(c)-(d) (1987).
110. Id. § 426.4.
111. 51 Fed. Reg. 40,751 (1986).
112. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ISSUE PAPER No. 3, at 1
(1986).
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farm as one integrated unit. The final rules permit the owner to escape
full cost pricing on the entire farm." 3
Don Villarejo of the California Institute for Rural Studies docu-
mented glaring examples of such abuse.' 14 For instance, Villarejo traced
the recent transformation of a large-scale farming operation into seven
discrete business entities in the Westlands Water District. Five of these
entities are trusts, and all but two of these "new" landholdings are less
than 960 acres. Villarejo found that each of these allegedly separate
"farms" actually reports the identical address to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. 1 5 While the entire operation totals 6,279 acres, just 63
acres are subject to full cost pricing."16 Villarejo also found that the
trustees and trustors are all stockholders of the same corporation that
farms the land in question. He concluded:
It can hardly be an accident that the seven "separate" farms listed
above were formed subsequent to the passage of the RRA and that,
with two exceptions, each have landholdings less than 960 acres. This
suggests that rather than being seven independent farms they form, in
fact, a single farming unit.' 17
As the Bureau itself pointed out:
[P]arents who are subject to the discretionary provisions could estab-
lish a separate trust for each of their minor children. They could then
claim, as some already have, that each child is actually a nondependent
and entitled to own and receive irrigation water on 960 acres. The
claim for a child's nondependency has even been made based on the
child's holding title to Reclamation land. By permitting such holdings
to count, basically all minors can prove nondependency. 118
The proposed rules would have limited the use of trusts to evade the
960-acre limit by requiring that trusts be irrevocable.' ' 9 If the trust was
revocable, all land covered by the trust would be attributed to the owner/
grantor's landholding. Also, the proposed rules would have prevented
the trust's beneficiaries (if they were minors) from using the trust as a
basis of financial independence for the first year if the beneficiaries had
been listed the previous year as dependents on the owner/grantor's tax
113. See 43 C.F.R. § 426.6(b)(4) (1987).
114. Testimony of Dr. Don Villarejo, Executive Director, California Institute for Rural
Studies, Before the U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Sacramento, California (Dec. 11, 1986) [herein-
after Villarejo Testimony] (on file at The Hastings Law Journal); How MUCH is ENOUGH,
supra note 96.
115. Villarejo Testimony, supra note 114, at 4.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5.
118. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ISSUE PAPER No. 3, at 1
(1986).
119. § 426.6(b)(4), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,753 (1986).
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returns. 120 As indicated above, the earlier field draft of the rules would
have gone even further and prevented the trust property from being used
as a basis for establishing the financial independence of the trust benefi-
ciaries altogether.12 1
These protections were discarded in the final rules, which do not
require that trusts be irrevocable to include the acreage in the benefici-
ary's entitlements. 122 In addition, the final rules allow a beneficiary to
use income derived from the land (even though farmed by the parent in
the case of a minor) as the basis of the beneficiary's independent sta-
tus. 123 This provision was adopted in response to water users' comments
on the proposed rules that "the Act itself does not provide any limita-
tions on trusts other than the limitations on the ownership entitlement of
any single beneficiary."' 124 Thus, the final rules permit large operators to
continue to use trusts in connection with farm management arrange-
ments to evade acreage limitations and full cost pricing.
(3) Operation and Maintenance Charges
As described earlier, the Bureau capitulated to the growers' position
regarding the treatment of 0 & M costs in amended contracts.' 25 In the
1983 rules, the RRA's requirement that the price in all amended con-
tracts "be at least sufficient to recover all operation and maintenance
charges" 126 was interpreted to mean that the price must be sufficient only
to cover 0 & M costs, regardless of repayment of the district's share of
the project's construction costs. 127 Under this approach, little if any rev-
enue would be collected from districts with amended contracts to cover
their share of capital costs.
In 1986, however, the Bureau finally acknowledged its obligation to
recapture an appropriate share of capital costs in addition to 0 & M
costs even under 9(e) contracts when it stated:
The emphasis within the RRA on the collection of at least full 0 & M
should not be interpreted to mean that the law placed a deemphasis on
the recovery of capital expenditures. It did not. Sections 203 and 208
in combination clearly mandate the measures necessary to correct any
120. § 426.6(b)(4), (d)(6), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,753, 40,755 (1986).
121. See supra note 92.
122. This loophole was narrowed substantially by Congress in its 1987 amendments to the
RRA. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. § 390nn(b) (1987). See infra
note 154 and accompanying text.
123. 43 C.F.R. § 426.6(b)(4) (1987).
124. Dep't of the Interior News Release 4 (Apr. 9, 1987).
125. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
126. § 208(a), 43 U.S.C. § 390nn(a) (1982).
127. § 426.8(a), 48 Fed. Reg. 54,758 (1983).
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past contracting practice which may have inadvertently resulted in an-
nual direct repayments that do not at least cover 0 & M. The recovery
of the capital investment, at least up to the agricultural users' ability to
pay, is still one of the underpinnings of Reclamation law and was not
changed by RRA.128
While the final rules adopted in 1987 do not fully carry out that obliga-
tion, they do at least give a nod to the capital component. They provide
that if a district's contract rate, less the 0 & M costs of delivering water,
is positive when the district amends its contract to conform with the
RRA, that positive difference must still be paid annually to the United
States to cover capital costs, in addition to any adjusted 0 & M costs. 129
If the contract rate is equal to or less than 0 & M costs, however, the
rate will be increased only to cover 0 & M costs, and no additional pay-
ments to cover capital costs will be required. °3 0 Although this change
pays lip service to the mandate to collect full repayment of capital costs,
it continues to allow many districts to pay a rate that falls short of the
requirement. Indeed, it rewards those districts that were contributing
the least to capital repayment.
(4) Involuntary Foreclosures
Under the RRA, land that exceeds 160 acres and is sold after the
expiration of a recordable contract must be sold at a price approved by
the Secretary of the Interior.' 3 ' Additionally, it must carry a ten-year
deed covenant restricting resale at a price higher than that approved by
the Secretary. 132 During the RRA debates, some bankers and large land-
owners hoped Congress would grant an exemption from this deed cove-
nant restriction for formerly excess land that is subject to involuntary
foreclosure. 133 While they did not succeed, a new battle was waged over
128. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS-
MENT, PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR ACREAGE LIMITATION 6 n.3 (1986) [hereinafter ENVI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT].
129. 43 C.F.R. § 426.8 (1987).
130. Id. The final rules give the following example:
A district amends its water service contract for the sole purpose of conforming to the
discretionary provisions. Prior to its amendment, the district's contract obligated it
to pay a rate of $3.00 per acre-foot of water for the remaining 10 years of its 30-year
contract. At the time of the contract amendment, the district's actual 0 & M costs
are $6.50 per acre-foot. Since the current contract rate of $3.00 does not cover these
O & M costs, the district's rate will be increased to $6.50. If the district's 0 & M
costs increase by $.50 per acre-foot the following year, the district's rate would then
be adjusted to $7.00 per acre-foot.
Id.
131. § 209(a), 43 U.S.C. § 390ii(a) (1982).
132. Id.
133. See Reclamation Reform Act Hearing, Transcript of Proceedings, Before the U.S.
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the issue during the 1987 rulemaking process because the language in the
RRA is potentially ambiguous, on this point.
The need for such a price restriction was explained by the Bureau in
a report on the impacts of the final rules:
When excess land is sold with the expectation that it will be eligible to
receive project water in the hands of the new owner, a covenant must
be placed in the deed requiring Secretarial price approval on any resale
of that land for a period of 10 years following the date of its sale from
excess status. This covenant prevents the excess land buyer from resel-
ling the land at fair market value and thereby reaping an unwarranted
windfall based on the Federal investment in the land. This require-
ment discourages the buying of excess land for speculative profit and
encourages the purchase of excess land by legitimate farmers. 134
Restrictions on the sale price of excess land lie at the heart of recla-
mation law because they insure that large landholdings will be broken
up, and that the benefits of the reclamation program will be distributed
widely. 135 These goals were reaffirmed explicitly in the RRA.136 Section
209(f) of the RRA requires that
[e]xcess lands which have been or may be disposed of in compliance
with Federal reclamation law ... shall not be considered eligible to
receive irrigation water unless...
(2) in the case of disposals made after October 12, 1982, their title is
burdened by a covenant prohibiting their sale, for a period of ten years
after their original disposal to comply with Federal reclamation law
... for values exceeding the sum of the value of newly added improve-
ments and the value of the land as increased by market appreciation
unrelated to the delivery of irrigation water.137
The intent of the RRA is that while truly nonexcess land can be sold
at its full market value, formerly excess land cannot be sold above the
secretarial-approved price by anyone for the ten-year period of the deed
covenant. The radical change sought by certain commercial and finan-
cial interests was the ability to use legal processes such as foreclosure,
deed in lieu of foreclosure, or "gifts," as a way to abolish or remove deed
covenants before ten years has expired. Yet, Congress intended no such
loophole in the RRA. Had Congress wished to provide a method by
which deed covenants could be avoided, it would have added such lan-
guage to section 209(f)(2).
Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation 27-28 (Dec. 19, 1986) (statement of Rep. George
Miller) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
134. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 128, at 5.
135. See United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
136. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 458, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 reprinted in 1982 CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1267, 1268; 128 CONG. REC. 26,073 (statement of Rep. Udall).
137. § 209(f), 43 U.S.C. § 390ii(f) (1982) (emphasis added).
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To understand the potential impact of allowing lenders and others
to ignore the deed covenant, consider the potential opportunities for
Southern Pacific Railroad, which, through subsidiaries, owns over
100,000 acres in the Westlands Water District in California. 138 Virtually
all of this excess land has been under recordable contract since the 1960s
and 1970s and therefore must be sold in the next few years. 139 The price
will have to be approved by the Secretary and must not reflect the value
of the Bureau water supply. But if Southern Pacific were to hold the new
mortgage on each of these parcels of land, and then foreclose a few years
later and resell the land at the full market value, theoretically it could
circumvent the entire purpose of the recordable contract. By doing this,
Southern Pacific (or any other excess landowner) still could obtain the
full land value of the federal water supply after having enjoyed the bene-
fit of subsidized Bureau water on its excess land for the last fifteen years.
Similarly, a landowner precluded from selling her excess land at full
market value could take out a loan on the land for its full market value
and then default on the loan. The bank then could turn around and sell
the land for full market value, thus allowing both the defaulting owner
and the bank to obtain full market value on the excess land in spite of the
deed covenant. As the Bureau staff pointed out in an issue paper, this
would permit an excess landowner to "captur[e] through a loan what the
law does not allow through a sale."' 140 The issue paper also noted that
there is a likelihood of "cozy" foreclosures for speculative gain.,41 More-
over, the paper emphasized that removing deed covenants from involun-
tarily foreclosed land may loosen banks' lending policies so that "almost
anyone, particularly nonfarmer investors or speculators, [can] become
active participants in the bid for excess land, thereby reducing the likeli-
hood that real farmers will be able to compete successfully for the
land."1 42
To avoid such scenarios, the proposed regulations would have re-
quired that the ten-year deed covenant apply even in the event of invol-
untary foreclosure. 143 Nonetheless, numerous banks and water users
138. A "Multiple Ownership Report of Landholdings" submitted on April 19, 1987 by
Southern Pacific's parent company, Sante Fe-Southern Pacific Corporation, listed 112,176.20
acres in reclamation districts, including 103,292.27 acres in Westlands (document on file at
The Hastings Law Journal).
139. In fact, Southern Pacific recently announced its intention to begin selling these lands.
See Johnson, Subsidies Gush from Loophole, Sacramento Bee, Oct. 11, 1987, at Al, col. 1.




143. § 426.16(a)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,771 (1986).
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pressed hard to change the proposed rule. Eventually, in response to
"concerns that the proposed rules did not comport with the language of
the RRA and would limit the use of formerly excess land to support
credit for legitimate farm operations,"' 44 the Bureau backed away from
the more restrictive proposed rules.
While the proposed rules would have allowed removal of the deed
covenant solely for land used to secure an operational loan,1 45 the final
rules create an enormous loophole in the deed covenant restriction
through the device of "involuntarily acquired land." Specifically, sec-
tions 426.16 and 426.11(h)(2) provide that a deed covenant may be re-
moved from land that is acquired involuntarily through foreclosure (or
any similar involuntary process of law), conveyance in satisfaction of a
debt (including, but not limited to, a mortgage, real estate contract, or
deed of trust), inheritance, devise, or gift. 146 Once again, the final rules
give in completely to the arguments made by financial interests and the
largest landholders.
(5) Reporting Requirements
A final respect in which the Bureau has neglected its RRA obliga-
tions is in the collection of ownership and leasing data. One of the ways
that Congress sought to reduce abuses in the reclamation program was
by increasing the reporting requirements for reclamation beneficiaries.
Thus, the RRA provides that "[a]ny contracting entity subject to the
ownership or pricing limitations of federal reclamation law shall compile
and maintain such records and information as the Secretary deems rea-
sonably necessary to implement sections 390aa to 390zz-1 of this title
and Federal reclamation law."1 47 The Secretary then issued "certifica-
tion and reporting forms" for districts to collect from each water user.' 48
Given that farming operations have exceeded the 160-acre limitation pri-
marily through leasing arrangements, one would have expected the Bu-
reau to use its authority to begin collecting lease data immediately. After
meeting with water users, however, the Bureau decided to wait until
1987 before requesting leasing information from landowners in districts
144. Dep't of the Interior News Release 6 (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file at The Hastings Law
Journal).
145. § 426.16, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,771 (1986).
146. §§ 426.11(h)(2), 426.16, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,771 (1986). Subsequently, the Bureau
amended those rules to delete the term "gift." 52 Fed. Reg. 39,918 (1987).
147. § 228, 43 U.S.C. § 390zz (1982).
148. See 43 C.F.R. § 426.10 (1987).
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remaining under the old law,149 again illustrating the Bureau's general
reluctance to implement the RRA. This is particularly irresponsible
given that the hammer clause went into effect in April 1987150 and, there-
fore, the Bureau needed, at a minimum, complete leasing data from 1986
(compiled and analyzed) to carry out its mandate under that clause.
C. Reaction to the 1987 Final Rules
Congressional and editorial reaction to the final 1987 rules was in-
dignant. Representative Miller, chairman of the subcommittee with
oversight of the Bureau, criticized the regulations as having "severely
undermined the 1982 law in many respects by permitting the use of
trusts, farm management arrangements and other devices to circumvent
the acreage limitation."1 5 1 On June 26, 1987, the House of Representa-
tives passed an appropriations amendment in response to the final rules
designed to protect the good features of the RRA from "the greed of the
few, and the complicity of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Interior
Department in that evasion of the intent of the law."'152 Congressman
Miller stated that the amendment was "necessitated by the unbelievable
allegation of the Commissioner of Reclamation that he has no responsi-
bility to enforce the intent of reclamation law." 53 Although that mea-
sure was revised by a House-Senate Conference Committee, the final
language in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act enacted significant,
though limited, amendments to the RRA that should close some loop-
holes and tighten overall enforcement capabilities. 54 Unfortunately, the
Bureau's new rules to implement the 1987 amendments also are flawed,
reflecting a continued refusal to carry out congressional intent with any
vigor. 155 Thus, despite the progress in the 1987 amendments, much re-
mains to be done to carry out the mandate of the 1982 Act.
149. Water and Agribusiness Newsletter, Jan. 25, 1985, at 3 (on file at The Hastings Law
Journal).
150. § 203(b), 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b).
151. 133 CONG. REc. H5450 (daily ed. June 24, 1987) (statement of Rep. Miller).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5302(a), 100
Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390nn, 390ww (Supp. 1988)). The amendments in
§ 5302 clarify that full cost must be paid for water delivered to any land under recordable
contracts that are more than ten years old and that revocable trusts are not covered by the
RRA's acreage limitation exemption for trusts. They also require the Bureau to audit all farm
operations, collect all underpayments and past due water charges with interest, and report to
Congress annually about the progress of the agency's enforcement efforts.
155. The final rules implementing the 1987 amendments were issued on December 16,
1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 50,530 (1988).
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IV. Recommendations
The Bureau can and should do a number of things to correct its
misinterpretation and betrayal of the RRA. First, and foremost, the Bu-
reau should go back to the proposed rules of November 1986 and renew
its earlier effort to carry out the intent and purpose of the RRA. With-
out a departmental commitment to effectuate congressional intent, any
rulemaking inevitably will be flawed.
Second, the Bureau should consider carefully the existing rules of
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) governing the
crop subsidy program.1 56 The crop subsidy program and the reclamation
program have similar limitations and often apply to the same farmers.
Consequently, many of the methods used to evade the subsidy limitations
of the USDA are similar to the paper farming scams used to circumvent
the reclamation limitations. The USDA regulations, however, are more
successful in policing abuse. For example, they require that trusts for
minor children not be treated as separate "persons" for purposes of the
subsidy limitation unless the child's parents take no part in the operation
of the child's farm and own no interest in the farm; 157 they strictly limit
the use of farm operating agreements (referred to as "custom farming"
arrangements) to avoid the subsidy limits;15 8 and they have an explicit
penalty for the use of any "scheme or device" to evade the rules.' 59 In
sum, while the USDA regulations, like the Bureau's proposed 1986 regu-
lations, would not be completely satisfactory in carrying out the RRA's
flat limitation on subsidies, they provide a far superior starting point than
the Bureau's discredited final rules of 1987.
A third measure that could help improve the Bureau's enforcement
of the RRA would be the restoration and expansion of the Bureau's
Acreage Limitation Branch. Until the drafting of the final 1987 rules,
this unit of the Bureau, which employed the agency's top experts on rec-
lamation law and acreage limitations, was responsible for drafting and
implementing all rules under the RRA. When the Branch's proposed
1986 rules caused an uproar among the regulated water users, however,
the political appointees of the department simply removed the Branch
from any further decisionmaking on the rules. Instead, the final rules
were written by political appointees in Sacramento and Washington, and
their staffs, whose views were closer to those of the regulated commercial
interests. In June 1988, the Branch was dissolved altogether and its di-
156. See 7 C.F.R. § 795.1-.24 (1988).
157. Id. §§ 795.9, 795.12.
158. Id. § 795.16.
159. Id. § 795.17.
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rector transferred to an entirely new field. Despite a chorus of protests
from the oversight committees in Congress, 160 this blatant retaliation was
allowed. As a result the Bureau is finding virtually no violations or im-
proprieties under the RRA even when auditing large scale farming oper-
ations that have not increased their rates. 16 1 Restoring an experienced
enforcement branch beyond the reach of political appointees and giving
it the necessary staff for serious enforcement are essential to giving the
RRA's pricing and acreage limits any meaningful effect.
Finally, if the Bureau, despite the RRA's manifest legislative intent,
persists in the belief that problems in the law prevent it from carrying out
that congressional intent, the Bureau should seek legislative amendments
from Congress rather than simply evading the congressional intent to
serve western water users.
Conclusion
In developing final rules to implement the RRA, the Bureau has
sided repeatedly with the large-scale farming interests, who receive the
largess of federal water subsidies, instead of carrying out its clear en-
forcement obligations. Indeed, the Environmental Assessment, released
by the Bureau with the final 1987 rules, admits that the decision to reject
the Bureau's own proposed rules and to adopt rules advocated by west-
ern agribusiness will cost the taxpayers more money, allow farmers more
ways to avoid full cost pricing, and, most appalling of all, primarily bene-
fit only four hundred and fifty-six of the largest farm operations, which
are located almost exclusively in two of the seventeen reclamation
states. 162
The final rules adopted by the Bureau defy the intent and the man-
date of the RRA. Even more troubling, the entire revision of the pro-
posed rules reflects the Bureau's willingness to abandon all hope of
carrying out the goals of the RRA, giving large growers the benefit of
every doubt, especially every opportunity to avoid full cost pricing. Any
hope that the Bureau would use the RRA to limit subsidies to the origi-
160. See, e.g., Letter from Representatives George Miller, Sam Gejdenson, and Patricia
Schroeder to Secretary Donald Hodel (June 16, 1988) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal);
Letter from Senator Bill Bradley to Secretary Donald Hodel (May 16, 1988) (on file at The
Hastings Law Journal).
161. See, e.g., Memorandum from Assistant Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation,
Sacramento, California, to Deputy Commissioner of Reclamation (Aug. 15, 1988) (entitled
Audit of Farming Operations Identified by Don Villarejo--Reclamation Reform Act (RRA)) (on
file at The Hastings Law Journal).
162. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ACREAGE LIMITATION
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 17-26 (Apr. 8, 1987).
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nally intended beneficiaries was undermined by the final 1987 rules. For
the Bureau to restore any public faith in its ability, and commitment, to
enforce limits on taxpayer subsidies, an entire change in its approach is
needed.

